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INTRODUCTION 
Flavell (1976) has defined metacognition as thinking that takes 
any sort of cognitive process or product as its object. If the object 
in question is memory, such metacognition is referred to as metamemory. 
Similarly, if the object in question is communication, such metacognition 
is referred to as metacommunication. 
Most studies dealing with metamemory in children have attempted 
to answer what appears to be a central question concerning metamemory: 
"What might a person conceivably come to know, or know how to find 
out, concerning memory as a function of cognitive growth and learning, 
experience?" (Flavell and Wellman, 1977, p. 6). Flavell and Well man 
(1977), in an attempt to answer such a question, have proposed two 
basic types of knowledge the child has to acquire. A child should 
learn which situations do and which situations do not call for 
intentional memory-related behaviors. This type of learning con­
stitutes what Flavell and Wellman call the 'sensitivity' category. 
A child should also learn about the major variables that influence 
memory performance, such as who is doing the memorizing (Person), 
what is to be remembered (Task), and how to memorize (Strategy). 
This type of learning forms the 'variable' category. 
Flavell (1976) has attempted to apply these basic ideas relevant 
to the development of metamemory to the area of communication, 
suggesting deep commonalities among the two cognitive phenomena. 
He has suggested that the observed difficulties children have in 
the area of communication (research in general shows that children 
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have problans when communicating, Glucksberg, Krauss and Higgins, 
1975), result from children's lack of understanding of the knowledge 
which constitutes the sensitivity and variable categories. 
Many researchers have investigated the effects of person, task 
and strategy variables on memory behaviors. The main concern, however, 
has been on studying the effects of these variables separately. Only 
recently Wellman (1978) and Mellman, Collins and Glieberman (1981) 
attempted to look more directly at children's knowledge of the 
interactions among these variables. However, these studies only 
investigated the combined effect of either person and task variables, 
person and strategy variables or task and strategy variables. To 
date, three-way interactions of these variables have not been examined. 
Research related to children's understanding of the combined effects 
of person, task and strategy variables on communicative behaviors 
has not been done as well. Furthermore, research attempting to 
look at the possible commonalities among cognitive phenomena in 
general and memory and communication in particular, in relation to 
the variable category, is limited.to a study by Yussen and Bird 
(1979). 
The purpose of this study was: (1) to look at children's under­
standing of the combined effects of person, task and strategy variables 
on memory and communicative behaviors (both two-way and three-way 
interactions were considered), and (2) to assess whether or not 
children's understanding follows the same pattern of development 
across the two cognitive domains: memory and communication. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Metaraemory 
Flavell and Wellman (1977) in an attempt to answer a develop-
mentally very important question—What are the different types of 
knowledge that a child needs to acquire about memory?—have proposed 
two such categories of knowledge. A child should learn which situa­
tions do and which situations do not call for intentional memory-
related behaviors. This constitutes the sensitivity category. A 
child should also learn about the major variables that influence 
memory performance: person, task and strategy. The person, task 
and strategy variables form the variables category. Since the purpose 
of this study was to look at the variable category and not the 
sensitivity category, only the former will be discussed. 
Many researchers have investigated the effects of person, task 
and strategy variables on memory behavior, however, the main concern 
has been on studying separately the effects of these variables. 
The person variable refers to knowledge of oneself and others 
as memorizers. Two related types of knowledge in the person category 
are (1) general previously-acquired knowledge about the properties 
of self and others (an individual, through experience, may realize 
that he is good in remembering faces of the people but not their 
names), and (2) ability to interpret concrete experiences in the 
here-and-now (an individual can learn to read his own memory states). 
In the case of general properties, it was found that older 
children are more aware of their own memory abilities and limitations 
than the younger ones (Brown, 1978; Flavell, Friedrichs and Hoyt, 
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1970; Kreutzer, Leonard and Flavell, 1975; Markman, 1977). 
Flavell et al. (1970) asked children to predict how many 
objects they would be able to recall in correct serial order, and 
immediately tested them to do so. Younger children, 4 to 6-year-
olds, predicted 'unrealistically' the number of pictures they could 
recall, while older children, 7 and 8-year-olds were able to predict 
more accurately their capabilities. 
Brown (1978) also found that young children's estimates are 
often unstable and inconsistent, e.g. estimating that they can 
recall 6 items, cannot recall 7, but can recall 8 or 9, etc. 
Markman (1977) tested 5-year-olds on a task similar to Flavell 
et al. (1970) and found that children of this age: (1) are very 
unrealistic in predicting their own recall, (2) can predict their 
ability to perform a certain task (distance they can jump) more 
accurately than their ability to recall, (3) can predict other's 
ability to recall with the same accuracy as their own and (4) 
understand that older subjects can recall more than younger ones. 
The major contribution to understanding many aspects of the 
development of metamemory, including person variables, was done by 
Kreutzer et al. (1975). In the study, twenty children at each of 
the grades K, 1, 3 and 5 were tested on 14 different tasks dealing 
with the problems of retrieval or preparation for future retrieval. 
Data relevant to person variables show that older children were 
better in understanding that memory abilities vary from one situation 
to another within the same individual, that older children can 
recall better than younger ones, that older chldren will study 
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differently in preparation for future recall than younger ones, 
and that briefly presented information is subject to rapid memory 
loss. 
In the case of here-and-now memory, studies show that older 
children are again more aware of their menory states. 
Children in the study by Flavell et al. (1970) were asked 
to carefully study a set of items. After they had signaled their 
readiness to recall them, they were immediately tested. It was 
found that 4- to 6-year-olds were less proficient at estimating 
their readiness for recall than 9 and 10-year-olds. Younger 
children signaled to be ready before time. 
Yussen and Levy (1975) exposed preschoolers to practice trials 
before asking them to predict their ability to recall and found no 
improvements. The authors "were amazed by the several preschoolers 
who actually predicted that they could recall 9 or 10 items after 
just being shown they could not recall this many in the...practice 
sequence" (p. 507). However, there is some evidence that shows that 
younger subjects (5-year-olds) have at least some awareness of how 
well they have done on a retrieval test (Moynahan, 1973). In this 
study, for example, 5-year-olds realized easily which items they 
recalled and which ones they missed, when shown the entire set 
afterwards. On the other hand, when asked to assess their readiness 
to recall, younger subjects were very poor in comparison to older 
ones. 
Knowledge of task demands understanding of things, such as 
knowing that tasks that are familiar to the subject, or have some 
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meaning to him, will be easier to store and retrieve; tasks that 
are related in some logical or causal way will be easier to recall 
since one item may cause the recall of another; longer tasks are 
harder to recall than shorter. 
Research shows that 9- and 11-year-olds are better than 5- and 
7-year-olds in realizing the above variables, however, even the younger 
subjects, the 6- and 7-year-olds were aware of some of the above 
variables (Kreutzer et al., 1975; Moynahan, 1973). 
Kreutzer et al. (1975) tested 6-, 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds on 
various tasks. On one task children were presented with a list of 
words (bed, tie, shoes) and then they were told a story which contained 
those words (A man gets up out of bed, and gets dressed putting on 
his best tie and shoes). The children were then asked if the story 
presentation would make it easier or harder for a child of their age 
to remember the pictures and why. Older children agreed more often 
than younger that the story presentation would help a child remember 
the words easier. The reasoning they gave was "intelligible" and 
"appropriate." 
In another task, Kreutzer et al. (1975) presented children with 
sets of words and told them "These words are opposites, boy goes with 
girl, hard goes with easy, cry goes with laugh, and black goes with 
white. These other words are people and things they might do, so 
Mary goes with walk, Charley goes with jump, Joe goes with climb and 
Anne goes with sit." The children were asked which sets of words 
would be easier to remember and why. Most 5- and 7-year olds did 
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not see that the "pairs of opposites" will be easier to learn; the 
9- and 11-year-olds realized this and could also explain why. 
In still another task, however, Kreutzer et al. (1975) presented 
6- and 7-year-olds with twenty pictures and asked them who can 
remember the pictures better—a child that studies them for one 
minute or a child that studies them for five minutes. Almost half of 
the 6-year-olds and almost all the 7-year-olds realized that studying 
for five minutes has to be more effective. Thus, younger children 
are aware of at least some of the variables that can help in remem­
bering a certain task. 
Under the strategy variable a child should learn about different 
memory strategies that can help recall. A child can mentally elaborate 
upon the material to be retrieved, e.g., using rehearsal (keep repeating 
the items that need to be remembered) and/or grouping (try to organize 
the items that have something in common into the smaller categories: 
apple, banana and pear belong to the fruit category). A child can 
also help recall by making notes, using photographs or using other 
external cues. Research shows that younger as well as older children 
tend to use external over internal resources (Kreutzer et al., 1975). 
Flavell, Beach and Chimsky (1966) tested rehearsal strategies 
of 5-, 7- and 10-year-olds and found that 5-year-olds do not rehearse, 
that 7-year-olds rehearse irregularly and that only 10-year-olds 
used rehearsal more regularly. Moely, Olson, Halwes and Flavell (1969) 
obtained similar results when looking at children's grouping abilities. 
Kreutzer et al. (1975) used different tasks to test preparation 
strategies of children. In one of the preparation tasks, a child had 
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to imagine that he is going ice skating, and was asked to tell what 
he would do to make sure he would not forget his skates. Data show 
that children of all grade levels tried to help themselves by using 
external sources, e.g. asking mother to remind than, writing a note, 
leaving the skates by the door. The children would speak less of 
internal sources such as thinking about the skates the night before, 
or rehearsing things that have to be done that morning. 
Kreutzer et al. (1975) also tested children's knowledge on 
retrieval strategies. Children were asked to imagine that they 
lost a jacket at school and now had to think of all the possible 
ways that would help to find it. As expected, the older children 
could think of a greater number of different retrieval strategies 
than the younger ones. While younger children did think of some 
good strategies (e.g. asking others for help, try the school's Lost 
and Found), older children thought of more elaborate strategies such 
as: 'First I'd do X, and if I didn't find it there, then I'd look 
in Y.' 
On another Kreutzer et al. (1975) retrieval strategy task, a 
child was told: 'Suppose your friend has a dog and you ask him how 
old his dog is. He tells you he got his dog as a puppy one Christmas 
but can't remember which Christmas. What things could he do to help 
him remember which Christmas he got his dog? Anything else he could 
do? (p. 35). According to the authors, 5-year-olds probably did not 
understand the problem thus could not solve it; 7-year-olds often 
mentioned asking adults for help (relying on external sources). 
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while 11-year-olds were able to think of internal strategies as: 
'try to remember things associated with dog's arrival, tr7 to 
remember some of the toys he got the same Christmas.' 
While the above studies all focus on a single variable category 
{person or task or strategy), only a few researchers have attempted 
to investigate children's knowledge of the combined effects of 
various person, task and strategy variables. The questions to be 
asked are: (1) To what extent is a child aware that, depending on 
who is storing, something is easily retreivable and something is 
not (Person X Task); (2) that use of strategy variables should 
depend on the nature of the task (Strategy X Task); (3) that some 
individuals prefer one strategy to another (Person X Strategy); 
and (4) that strategic behavior needs to be related to both person 
and task (Strategy X Person X Task). 
Kreutzer et al. (1975) have some indirect evidence supporting 
children's understanding of this interaction of variables. Twenty 
children at each of grades k, 1, 3 and 5 were tested with 20 stimuli. 
Drawings of common objects such as stove, chair, fish etc. were used. 
The testing procedure consisted of presenting a child with the following 
paragraph: 'The other day I asked.two children to look at and learn 
some pictures (gestures at the pictures) because I wanted to see how 
well they could remember. I asked them how much time they would like 
to learn the pictures before I would take them away and ask them how 
many they could remember. One child said 1 minute. The other child 
said a longer time, 5 minutes. (1) Why do you think he wanted as long 
as 5 minutes? (2) Which child remembered the most, the one who studied 
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1 minute, or the one who studied 5 minutes? (3) Why? (4) And what 
would you do, study 5 minutes or 1 minute? (5) Why?' (p. 18). Results 
show that the majority of subjects at each grade level thought that 
the child who studied for 5 minutes would remember more than a child 
who studied for 1 minute. Furthermore, they stated that they themselves 
would study 5 minutes rather than 1 minute. When asked why, one 
half of the kindergarteners and all the 1, 3 and 5 graders were able 
to give 'intelligible' and 'appropriate' explanations. Such findings 
indicate an understanding that the two variables, number of pictures 
to be remembered (task), and amount of studying time (strategy) 
taken jointly determine success. 
Flavell et al. (1970) failed to find any indications of such 
understanding with their young subjects. Subjects consisted of 4-, 
6-, 9- and 10-year-old children. Children were asked to study care­
fully different-length series of pictures. The series consisted of 
3 to 10 familiar objects such as houses, blocks, scissors etc. 
After children had signaled their readiness to recall the list, they 
were tested immediately. Results show that 4- and 6-year-olds were 
less proficient at estimating their readiness to recall than 9- and 
10-year-old children. In other words, younger children signaled to 
be ready before time, not understanding that number of items on the 
list does effect studying time. 
There are two possible reasons for this discrepancy in the 
results. A first reason may be an inability to understand the 
instructions. Children in the Flavell et al. (1970) study were 
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instructed to memorize. It might be that 4- and 5-year-olds 
simply did not understand the instruction - memorize! Appel, 
Cooper, McCarrell, Sims-Knight, Yussen and Flavell, (1972) 
suggested that younger children usually do not understand such 
instructions. A second reason may be difficulty of the task. In 
the Flavell et al. (1970) study children were asked to memorize a 
list of items. In order to remember a series of object names, a 
child has to rely on internal cues, a task too difficult for a 
4-year-old, since research shows (Kreutzer et al., 1975) that both 
younger and older children tend to rely on external rather than 
internal memory cues. In the Kreutzer et al. (1975) study, children 
were asked to respond to a story, a task much easier even for the 
4-year-olds. However, since the initial intention of both of the 
studies was not to test the child's understanding of the interaction 
of variables, the authors suggest that the results should be inter­
preted with caution. 
Wellman (1978) and Wellman et al. (1981) have attempted to 
look more directly at children's knowledge of the interaction of 
memory variables. Subjects for the 1978 study were 5- and 10-year 
old children; subjects for the 1931 study were 5-, 8-, 10- and 19-
year olds. Stimuli, that consisted of drawings of familiar objects, 
tested children's understanding of simple variables as well as their 
understanding of the interaction among variables. Results of the 
1978 study indicated that both 5- and 10-year-olds performed well 
on a simple variable situation (understanding that the number of 
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items make a task easier or harder and/or understanding that writing 
down a list of items is a better strategy than simply looking at 
the items); only 10-year-olds performed well on complex variable 
situations e.g., understanding that both variables, the number of 
items to be remembered and the strategy used, need to be considered. 
However, the younger subjects in the 1981 study were able to evaluate 
the difficulty of the task by looking at both variables involved, 
thus performing significantly better than the 5-year-olds in the 
1978 study. The reason for such a discrepancy in the results, 
according to the authors, is due to the difficulty of the task 
used in the 1973 study. What seems to be indicated is that young 
children are not aware of their own memory abilities. The lack of 
this awareness can be partially attributed to the lack of knowledge 
that is contained under the person, task and strategy variables. 
For example, young children do not understand how one's memory 
abilities differ relative to who is doing the memorizing (person), 
what is to be remembered (task), and how one goes about memorizing 
(strategy). Furthermore, young children do not understand how 
these variables taken together can affect one's memory performance. 
Metacomraunication 
Most studies dealing with communication in children focus on 
referential communication. Referential communication studies investi­
gate how a child uses the language he/she possesses in order to inform 
another person. In the simplest referential communication situation, 
there are two people, namely a speaker and a listener. The role of 
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the speaker is to put together the message in such a way that a 
listener can understand what the message refers to. Most commonly, 
knowing what the message refers to means being able to select the 
intended referent (a target stimulus) from a set of nonreferents (set 
of nontarget, alternative stimuli). The research in general shows 
that children have problems when communicating, both in the role of 
speaker and listener (Glucksberg et al., 1975). 
Flavell (1975), stating that there are deep commonalitities 
among cognitive phenomena in general, and manory and communication 
in particular, attempted to explain observed children's difficulties 
by drawing some parallels between the two cognitive areas. Flavell 
(1976) proposed that the lack of knowledge contained under the two 
major categories, sensitivity and variable category, which weakens 
children's performances on memory tasks, affects children's perform­
ances on communication tasks as well. Lack of knowledge related to 
person, task and strategy variables affects children's performances 
both in the roles of speakers and listeners. Whenever engaging in 
conversation, an experienced speaker knows that he/she needs to take 
into consideration who the listener is (person variable), what it is 
that he/she as a speaker has to communicate to the listener (task 
variable) and carefully choose the best possible way to convey the 
message to the listener (strategy variable). An experienced listener 
will in return listen to the message (task variable), critically 
evaluate it demanding for more information when necessary (strategy 
variable) and always take into consideration who the speaker is 
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{person variable). Research, however, shows that young children when 
communicating engage in such activities neither as speakers nor as 
listeners and consequently have problems communicating (Glucksberg 
et al., 1975). Flavell (1976) outlined some of the knowledge a young 
child needs to acquire under the person, task and strategy variables 
in order to improve his/her communicative abilities. 
In relation to the person variable, both the general previously-
acquired knowledge about the properties of self and others and the 
ability to interpret concrete experiences in the here-and-now, 
relate to the area of communication. 
In the case of general properties, a young child needs to learn 
about general abilities of both speakers and listeners. For example, 
he/she needs to know that all speakers and listeners have information 
processing biases and limitations that need to be taken into account 
when communicating. Thus, the same message should be presented 
differently to listeners of different ages and interests since this 
same message will be processed differently by different listeners. 
Conversely, a child needs to learn that the same message will be 
presented differently by different speakers according to their general 
abilities. In other words, a growing child needs to gradually 
develop some understanding about his abilities both as a speaker 
and a listener, and at the same time develop some understanding 
about the communicative abilities of others. Inevitably, such 
knowledge will influence children's communicative behaviors. 
Research shows that older children are more aware of the above 
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variables, however, there is some evidence showing that even 4-year-
olds have some of the needed knowledge. 
Shatz and Gel man (1973) found that 4-year-old children adjust 
their conversation to suit the needs of their different listeners. 
Four-year-old children were asked to talk to listeners who were 2-
year-olds, 4-year-olds and adults. Results indicated that the speech 
to the 2-year-olds contained more short and simple utterances than the 
speech to the adults. Four-year-olds choose to talk to their peers 
{4-year-olds) in the same way they talked to the adults. The same 
findings were obtained for both structured (where a child was asked 
to talk about a particular toy) and spontaneous conversations (where 
a child was asked to talk freely about anything). 
Cazden (1970) and Jakobson (1968) similarly suggested that 
preschoolers tend to 'talk down* to children younger than themselves. 
Sonnenschein and Whitehurst (1980) found that 6-year-old children 
become better communicators to adults after listening to competent 
peers, competent adults, incompetent peers but not incompetent adults. 
In other words, children exposed to good adult and/or peer models 
tended to imitate the models. When exposed to poor peer models, 
children attempted to modify and improve the conversation themselves. 
However, when exposed to poor adult models, children failed to engage 
in any modifications, but simply imitated inadequate conversations. 
The question that arose was - Why did the children not improve their 
conversation after listening to incompetent adults? The obtained 
results could not be explained by the fact that children had forgotten 
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the inadequate messages of the adults, as predicted. Children recalled 
the uninformative adult performances as well as they recalled the 
uninformative peer performances. The results could also not be 
explained by the fact that children tend to obey adults since children 
were explicitly told that an adult did a poor job and shouldn't be 
imitated. Rather, the results were apparently due to the fact that 
children have different expectations of how well the different aged 
speakers communicate. Children expecting adults to send good messages, 
failed to see inadequacies in their messages, which prevented children 
from modifying the adults poor messages. On the other hand, children 
expected their peers to be capable of sending poor messages, saw 
them as poor, and modified them accordingly. 
In the case of here-and-now, a child needs to learn to actively 
evaluate and monitor ongoing messages. The "task of the speaker is 
to be sensitive to: (1) the characteristics of listeners—the message 
should ideally take into account who the listener is, what the listener 
already knows and what he/she wants to know, (2) the referent-
nonreferent array—a speaker needs to provide information to a 
listener that discriminates between the referent and potentially 
confusing nonreferents, and (3) listener's feedback—if a listener 
indicates that he or she does not understand the message the speaker 
needs to modify the original message to suit the listener's needs. 
The task of the listener is to evaluate messages critically and 
ask for more information when and if necessary. Again, research 
shows that older children are better than younger ones in realizing 
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the above relationships. 
Flavell, Beach and Chimsky (1966) found that young children, 
in the role of speakers, are not able to take into consideration 
who the listener is and thus fail to decode the message to suit 
the needs of that particular listener. What they tend to do is to 
confuse their own perspective with that of the listener in communica­
tion situations. 
Besides not being able to take into consideration who the 
listener is, young children in the roles of speakers, fail to 
critically evaluate the message itself. Asher and Oden (1976) 
implied that younger children failed to engage in the comparison 
activity necessary for selecting messages that discriminate between 
referents and nonreferents. The task used consisted of presenting 
both the speaker and the listener with a pair of words (e.g., 
ocean-river). The speaker knew which word was underlined but the 
listener did not. The speaker's task was to provide a clue word, 
such as waves, so the listener could decide which was the under­
lined word. Young children failed to provide clues that pertained 
more to the referent word than to the nonreferent word. With 
respect to speaker's sensitivity to listener's feedback, Peterson, 
Danner and Flavell (1972) found that 4- and 7-year-olds reformulated 
their initial messages when the feedback was of an explicit, verbal 
nature (can you tell me anything else), but not when confronted 
with nonverbal expressions of noncomprehension or with implicit 
verbal requests. Only the 7-year-olds changed their messages in 
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response to an implicit verbal request (I don't understand), but 
even they did not react when feedback was of a nonverbal nature. 
Beal and Flavell (1982) stated that poor performances of children, 
in the role of listener, are not due to their lack of awareness of 
the ambiguity of messages, but are due to "fundamental metacognitive 
deficits in their knowledge about the communicative process." In 
other words, even when being aware of the inadequacy of a message, 
computed response latencies were longer to ambiguous than to unambig­
uous messages, younger children still failed to see how such ambiguous 
messages can affect the success or failure of communication. 
In the relation to the task variable, a young child needs to 
learn what makes one task easier or harder to understand when 
listening and explain when speaking. Research shows, however, 
that children have problems identifying a message as difficult 
both in the roles of speakers and listeners (Glucksberg et al., 
1975). 
Glucksberg et al. (1955) have developed a game to study 
communicative abilities of children which they called 'Stack the 
Blocks.' The purpose of the game is to build two matching stacks 
of blocks with the speaker providing the listener all the instruc­
tions. The major finding, obtained from a series of studies, was 
that pairs of nursery school children were unable to come up with 
the same matching stacks of blocks. The children's difficulty 
seemed to stem from their use of reference phrases which were idio­
syncratic and not descriptive of the forms. They tended to use 
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private imagery rather than conventional or socially shared forms. 
In other words, children failed to identify who the listener is. 
Children did not take into consideration, for example, that terms 
which are so familiar to them as speakers might not be as familiar 
to their listeners. Furthermore, children did not take into 
consideration the difficulty of the task. They did not realize 
that since the listener cannot see the speaker's block structure 
the speaker needs to provide as much detailed information as 
possible to assure the listener will complete the task success­
fully. 
Under the strategy variable a young child needs to learn 
certain strategies that will help his/her communicative behaviors 
both in the role of speaker and listener. As speaker, a good 
communicator should know how to organize and present information 
in order to facilitate comprehension and retention in the listener. 
As listener, a good communicator should know how to get the speaker 
to improve his/her message. Some of good speaker's strategies are: 
talk slowly and clearly, check with the audience whether or not a 
certain especially difficult concept has been understood, use 
visual aids such as pictures and slides, etc. Some good listener's 
strategies are: evaluate messages critically, ask for more information 
when necessary, etc. 
Research shows not only that young children do not engage in 
any of the above activities, but in what appears to be an even 
more serious problem, they are not even aware that such activities 
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are needed and can be useful (Robinson and Robinson, 1978). 
Several attempts have been made to train children to improve 
their communicative abilities. In the role of speakers, children 
were trained to organize and present information by taking into con­
sideration both the nature of the message itself and the various 
needs of listeners. In the role of listeners, children were trained 
to evaluate messages critically and were encouraged to ask for more 
information if and when necessary. A typical experimental procedure 
used in many training studies was to expose a child to 'appropriate 
means of communication' through various training and/or modeling 
techniques. The hypotheses tested explored whether or not children 
would respond to such training. 
Shantz and Wilson (1972) trained 24 7-year-old boys and girls 
on tasks which required a speaker to send a complete message so the 
listener could replicate a design and to send a limited but useful 
message so the listener could recognize the design. Each child took 
the roles of both speaker and listener and was trained on both 
tasks. When compared to subjects in the control group, trained 
subjects at posttesting gave significantly more useful information 
and had better overall evaluation of messages. 
Lempers and Miletic (1983) have used various training 
strategies involving modeling to train children's performances as 
listeners. The results indicated that the listener skills of the 
5-year-olds were not changed by such training. The training, 
however, proved to be both successful and long-lasting for 7-year-
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olds (children were retested one month after originally trained). 
Similar findings have been obtained by others (Patterson, îlassad 
and Cosgrove, 1978). 
With respect to metacommunication, research indicates that 
young children are not aware of their own communicative abilities. 
This is partially due to their lack of knowledge that is contained 
under the person (who is communicating), task (what is to be 
communicated), and strategy (how one goes about communicating) 
variables. It seem obvious that the above variables considered 
separately and in combination affect one's ability to communicate. 
However, research related to the combined effects of person, task 
and strategy variables on communicative behaviors of children has 
not been done. 
Metamemory and Metacommunication 
Research attempting to look at the possible relationships 
between metamemory and metacommunication, in relation to the variables 
category, is limited to a study by Yussen and Bird (1979). Yussen 
and Bird (1979) tested performances of 4- and 5-year-old children 
across three cognitive areas: memory, communication and attention. 
Under each cognitive area children's knowledge of four variables 
was assessed: (1) length—understanding that a longer list of 
items is more difficult to work with than a shorter list, (2) 
noise—understanding that noise interferes with performance, (3) 
time—understanding that shorter time vs. longer time available to 
finish a task will affect performance and (4) age—understanding 
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that older children tend to perform better on tasks than younger 
ones. The purpose was to see whether or not the same pattern of 
reasoning would be evident across all three cognitive areas. The 
results obtained suggested notable parallels in the performances 
across the 3 cognitive areas on all the four variables tested. 
Questions related to the variables of length and noise were easier 
than the questions related to the variables of age and time for 
both 4- and 6-year-olds. Performances of 6-year-olds were better 
than the performances of 4-year-olds on all of the tasks. 
The study, however, looked only at the performances of the 
children in relation to the separate effects of person, task and 
strategy variables. The interesting question remains as to whether 
or not the same results would be obtained when understanding of 
combined effects of person, task and strategy variables would be 
assessed. 
One of the purposes of the present study was to look at 
children's knowledge of the interaction of person, task and strategy 
variables in relation to memory and communicative behaviors of 
children. Both two-way and three-way interactions were considered. 
The questions that were asked were: (1) when is a child aware of 
such interactions; (2) to what extent is understanding of the 
independent effects of person, task and strategy variables necessary 
for understanding of the interactions among those variables and 
(3) do children first learn that more than one variable needs to 
be taken into consideration to solve the problem and only later 
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understand how those variables interact and affect ones cognitive 
ability or are those concepts acquired at the same time. 
The second purpose of the present study was to assess whether 
or not children's understanding of the variable category follows the 
same pattern of development across the two cognitive domains of 
memory and communication. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Subjects 
Subjects for the study were 18 nursery school children ranging 
in age from 4 years and 1 month to 4 years and 7 months with a mean 
age of 4.4 years; 18 kindergarteners ranging in age from 5 years and 
1 month to 5 years and 10 months with a mean age of 5.6 years; and 
18 first graders ranging in age from 7 years and 1 month to 7 years 
and 9 months with a mean age of 7.4 years. 
There were 10 boys and 8 girls in the nursery school group, 9 
boys and 9 girls in the kindergartener group and 9 boys and 9 girls 
in the first grader group. 
The nursery school was run by the YWCA (Young Women's Christian 
Association) while kindergarteners and first graders attended Airlawn 
Public School. The schools are located in Chevy Chase and Bethesda, 
Maryland which are both predominantly white upper middle-class suburbs 
of Washington, D.C. 
Criteria for the selection of children to be included in the study 
were: (1) each subject had to be between the ages of 4 years, 1 month 
and 7 years, 11 months; (2) each subject had to demonstrate complete 
understanding of the 'Recall task' and the 'Practice task.' 
Stimuli 
Two sets of three different picture cards each served as stimuli 
for the Recall task. The picture cards for the first Recall set had 
the drawings of a candle, a lamp and a cup. The picture cards for 
the second Recall set had the drawings of a flower, an apple and 
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an ice-cream. 
Two sets of three different picture cards each served as 
stimuli for the Practice task. The two Practice sets used depicted 
the following situation: Set 1 - One card of a girl with a fence 
taller than herself to jump over, one card of a girl with an ankle-
high fence to jump over and one card of a girl with a medium size 
fence to jump over. Set 2 - One card of a boy lifting a large 
a large box» one card of a boy lifting a small box and one card of 
a boy lifting a medium size box. 
The testing stimuli consisted of two groups: the first group 
contained 12 sets of three different picture cards and the second 
group contained 2 sets of 4 different picture cards. Pictures were 
hand drawings of people (woman, man, girl, boy) doings things such 
as reading, looking, writing, etc. Six sets of the first group 
were used to test condition 1 (judging the separate effect of 
person, task and strategy variables). The six remaining testing 
sets were used to test condition 2 (judging the interaction effect 
between two variables e.g., person X task, person X strategy and 
strategy X task). The second part contained 2 sets of four different 
picture cards and was used to test condition 3 (judging the three 
way interaction of the variables e.g., person X task X strategy). 
One example of each condition is given: Condition 1 - set related 
to person variable: One card of a woman with a story to remember/ 
communicate, one card of a girl with a story to remember/communicate 
and one card of a baby girl with a story to remember/communicate. 
Condition 2 - set related to person X strategy interaction: One 
26 
card of a woman with 18 items to remember/communicate who writes 
the items down, one card with a woman with 18 items to remember/ 
communicate who looks at the items and one card of a girl with 
18 items to remember/communicate who writes the items down. 
3 - set related to person X task X strategy interaction: One 
card of a woman with 9 items to remember/communicate who writes 
the items down, one card of a woman with 18 items to remember/ 
communicate who writes the items down, one card of woman with 9 
items to remember/communicate who only looks at the items and one 
card of a girl with 9 items to remember/communicate who writes the 
items down (Appendix A). 
Procedure 
Testing was done in a room furnished with a table, two chairs 
and a tape recorder. Children were brought individually to the 
room from their classrooms and were told that they would be playing 
a game. In the room, a child and the experimenter were seated at 
the table next to each other. On the table in front of the experi­
menter were 2 sets of picture cards needed for the Recall task, 
2 sets of picture cards needed for practice trials and 14 sets of 
picture cards need for testing, all stacked on top of each other in 
rows. Also in front of the experimenter was a notebook for recording 
the answers, and the cards with the questions to be asked. 
First a child was asked to do the Recall task. The two Recall 
sets of three different picture cards were used. When set one was 
shown, a child was told: '•look at these pictures carefully so later 
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you can tell me the names of these pictures from memory.*- Then, 
the set was described for a child as: ''This is a picture of a 
candle, this of a lamp and this of a cup*" (point to the pictures). 
After the pictures were described, the pictures were removed and 
the child was asked: "Tell me the names of those pictures from 
memory?When the second set was shown, a child was told: '•Look at 
these pictures carefully so later you can tell me what you have 
seen.*- Then, the second set was described for a child as: *-This is 
a picture of a flower, this of an apple and this of an ice cream.*-
Each time the picture card was described the experimenter pointed 
to it. After the pictures were removed, the child was asked: 
"-Tell me what you have seen?*- The procedure was repeated once 
more when and if necessary. Only children that were able to under­
stand and perform well on both sets of the Recall task were tested 
further. The specific purpose of the Recall task was to see whether 
or not children understood the instructions "-to tell from memory*-
and "-to tell to someone.*-
For the practice trials, the two Practice sets of three different 
picture cards were used. A child was told: "-Each of these cards 
have a boy or a girl (point to them) on them. They have to do 
something, just like you had to remember and tell what was on the 
pictures before.*" Then each set was described for a child. For 
example, when set 1 was shown a child was told: "-This is about a 
girl who had to jump a fence. Once she had to fence a wall which 
was bigger than herself, once she had to jump a fence which was 
coming to her ankles and once she had to jump a fence which was 
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coming to her waist. Which fence was the easiest to jump and 
why?"" When set 2 was shown, a child was told: '•This is about a 
boy who had to lift a box. Once he had to lift a small box, once 
he had to lift medium size box and once he had to lift a large 
box. Which box do you think it was easiest to lift and why?*-
Each time the picture card was described the experimenter pointed 
to it. The procedure was repeated once more if and when necessary 
and only children that performed well (responded correctly to both 
of the sets) were tested further. The purpose of the practice 
simuli was to introduce children to the test tasks and to prepare 
them to make judgments in terms of difficulty. 
Following the practice trial, a child was introduced to the 
testing phase as follows: ""Each of these cards (point to the testing 
stimuli) also have people on them that have to remember/tel1 something, 
just like you had to remember/tell those pictures before. Let^s 
see for whom of those people it is the easiest to remember/tell 
what they have seen on the pictures?*" The same stimuli ware used 
for metamemory and metacommunication tasks in order to assure 
constancy among variables in terms of difficulty. The child, 
however, was asked to respond to the stimuli differently. In 
relation to metamemory, a child was asked to respond to such 
questions as: Which things are easier to remember? Who has more 
problems remembering baby boy/baby girl, boy/girl, man/woman? 
Who has more problems remembering, a man who looks at 18 things or 
a boy who writes them down? Who has more problems reiTieinbering, a 
woman who has to remember 9 things and writes them down, a woman 
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who has to remember 18 things and writes them down, a woman who 
has to remember 9 things and only looks at them or a girl who has 
to remember 9 things and she writes them down?, etc. In relation 
to metacommunication, a child was asked to respond to the same 
questions. The only difference, however, was in substituting 
the verb ""to remember*• with the verb ""to tell^ e.g.. Who has 
more problems telling 18 things to a friend, a man who looks at 
them or a boy who writes them down? 
Fourteen sets were presented to a child and each set was 
described. For example, description for set 1 condition 1 was: 
"•This is about a man who had 9 things to remember/tell to a friend, 
a baby-boy who also had 9 things to remember/tell to a friend and a 
boy who also had 9 things to remember/tell to a friend. For whom 
do you think it was easier to remember/tell those things, for a 
man, a baby-boy or a boy and why?"* Description for set 1 condition 
2 was: ""This is about a girl who had 18 things to remember/tell 
to her friend and who wrote the things down, a girl who had 9 things 
to remember/tell to her friend and who looked at the things and a 
girl who had 9 things to remember/tell to a friend and wrote the 
things down. For which of these girls do you think it was easier 
to remember/tell to a friend things and why?*" Description for set 
1 condition 3 was: ""This is about a woman who had 9 things to 
remember/tell to a friend and who wrote the things down, a woman 
who had 18 things to remember/tell to a friend and who also wrote 
the things down, a woman who had 9 things to remember/tell to a 
friend and who looked at the things and a girl who had 9 things to 
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remember/tell to a friend and who wrote the things down. For whom 
to you think was the easiest to remember/tell to a friend things 
and why?*-
The order of the presentation of type of task (Memory vs. 
Communication), and of type of variable within condition (person» 
task, strategy and task X strategy, person X task, person X 
strategy) were counterbalanced by using the method of incomplete 
counterbalancing. The location of the correct picture card was 
also randomized. The order of presentation of type of condition 
(condition 1, condition 2, condition 3) was kept constant. 
Responses recorded by the experimenter were both the chosen 
picture card and the explanation given by a child as to why that 
particular card had been chosen. Therefore, both the chosen picture 
card and the explanation given by a child constituted the dependent 
measures. 
Children's responses were scored by two judges and an agreement 
of 100% was obtained for both the number of correct choices and the 
number of correct explanations. The correct score was defined relative 
to adult judgements: more items were judged to increase the difficulty 
of a task, writing the items down was considered a better strategy 
than just looking, two difficult attributes (more items and looking) 
made a task harder than a difficult and an easy attribute (looking 
and fewer items), three difficult attributes (more items, looking and 
younger person) made a task harder than two difficult and one easy 
attribute (more items, looking and older person), etc. 
In relation to the person variable all answers given by children 
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that described a woman on the pictures as a mother, teacher, grown-up, 
etc., and a man as a father, teacher, grown-up, etc., were taken as 
correct. The explanation for these answers was that young children 
in general tend to see parents, teachers and grown-ups as more 
knowledgeable than themselves. 
For each of the dependent measures, a child was assigned a 
score ranging from zero to two; zero signifying no correct responses, 
one signifying one correct response and two signifying two correct 
responses were given by a child. Thus, the total score a child could 
get on each of the dependent measures ranged from 0 to 14 for both 
cognitive domains. 
Data analysis was not done with individual person, task, 
strategy and/or person x task, task x strategy, person x strategy 
variables. Rather, summary variables were derived by summing the 
individual variables together. For example, a summary variable 
for Condition 1 was the sum of person + strategy + task variables, 
similarly, summary variables for Condition 2 was the sum of person 
X task + task x strategy + person x strategy variables. Since 
Condition 3 consisted of only one combination of variables person 
X task X strategy, summary variable was derived by multiplying the 
combination three times. This way, all three conditions were 
given equal weights. 
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RESULTS 
A 3 (Age) X 2 (Sex) X 2 (Cognitive Domain) X 3 (Condition) 
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the cognitive domain 
and condition variables was performed. 
No significant main effect for sex was found. This was true 
for both dependent measures: (1) number of correct choices, £(1 »48) = 
.14» £<.71 and (2) number of correct explanations» £(1»48) = .01» 
£<•92. 
No significant main effect involving domain was found. This 
was true for both dependent measures: (1) number of correct choices» 
ni »48) = .27» £<.61 and (2) number of correct explanations» F_(l »48) = 
3.78» £<.10. Performances of children seemed to be the same across both 
memory and communication tasks. The means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 1» Appendix C. 
The main effect of age reached significance for both dependent 
measures: (1) number of correct choices, F{2»48) = 7.77» p<.001 and 
(2) number of correct explanations, H2,48) = 13.35, p<.0001. Follow-
up comparisons were performed on the significant effects of.age using 
Tukey'-s two-tailed procedure. In relation to the number of correct 
choices, it was found that the 7-year-olds had higher scores than the 
4-year-olds (p<.01)» and that the 5-year-olds had higher scores than 
the 4-year-olds (p<.05). The performances of the 7-year-olds were not 
significantly different from the performances of the 5-year-olds. In 
relation to the number of correct explanations» it was found that the 
7-year-olds had higher scores than the 4-year-olds (p<.001), and that 
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the 5-year-olds had higher scores than the 4-year-olds {p<.001). 
Performances of the 5- and 7-year-olds did not differ significantly. 
The main effect of condition was significant for both dependent 
measures: (1) number of correct choices, F_(2»96) = 9.54, p<.001, 
and (2) number of correct explanations, F{2,95) = 24.58, p<.0001. 
Followup comparisons were performed on the significant effect of 
condition using Tukey^s procedure. In relation to the number of 
correct choices it was indicated that condition 3 was significantly 
more difficult than condition 1 (p<.01). However, condition 3 was 
not more difficult than condition 2, and condition 2 was not more 
difficult than condition 1. In relation to the number of correct 
explanations, it was found that condition 2 was more difficult than 
condition 1 {p<.01) and that condition 3 was more difficult than 
condition 1 (p<.001). Condition 3 was not significantly more difficult 
than condition 2. 
The only interaction effects that reached significance were 
between condition and age, and between condition, age and sex. 
The condition and age interaction effect reached significance for 
both dependent measures: (1) number of correct choices, £(4,96) = 
2.85, £<.03 and (2) number of correct explanations, £(4,96) = 8.09, 
2<.001. 
Relative to this finding two questions were asked: (1) Did 
children^: performances differ at each condition? and (2) Did condi­
tions differ at each age? Tests for simple effects were used for 
data analysis. Furthermore, significant simple effects were analyzed 
by Tukey'-s procedure. 
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Looking at age differences within each condition separately, 
it was found that the performances of the children were different 
across some conditions. Performances of the 4-, 5- and 7-year-old 
children did not differ across condition 1. This was true for 
both the number of correct choices and the number of correct 
explanations. Performances of the children did differ across 
condition 2, however. This was true for both the number of correct 
choices (p<.001) and the number of correct explanations (p<.0001). 
In relation to the number of correct choices, 5-year-olds had higher 
scores than 4-year-olds (p<.01), 7-year-olds had higher scores than 
4-year-olds (p<.01) and 5 and 7-year-olds did not differ significantly. 
In relation to the number of correct explanations, it was found that 
5-year-olds performed better than 4-year-olds (p<.01), that 7-year-
olds performed better than 4-year-olds (p<.001) and that the performances 
of the 7 and 5-year-olds did not differ significantly. 
Children's performances differed across condition 3 as well. 
This was true for both the number of correct choices {£<.001) and 
the number of correct explanations {£<.0001). In relation to the 
number of correct choices, it was found that 5-year-olds performed 
better than 4-year-olds (£<.05), that 7-year-olds performed better 
than 4-year-olds {£<.01) and that the performances of the 7-year-
olds were not significantly different from the performances of the 
5-year-olds. In relation to the number of correct explanations, it 
was found that 5-year-olds performed better than 4-year-olds {£<.01), 
that 7-year-olds performed better than 4-year-olds and that 7-year-
olds performed better than 5-year-olds {£<.05). 
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Looking at condition differences within each age separately, 
it was indicated that conditions did differ at age 4. This was true 
for both the number of correction choices (p<.0001) and the number 
of correct explanations {p<.00001). In relation to the number of 
correct choices, condition 2 was more difficult than condition 1 
(p<.01), condition 3 was more difficult than condition 1 (p<.001); 
however, conditions 2 and 3 did not differ significantly. In 
relation to the number of correct explanations, condition 2 was 
more difficult than condition 1 (p<.001), coi^ition 3 was more 
difficult than condition 1 (p<.001) and c?fWitions 2 and 3 did 
not differ significantly. At age 5, conditions did not differ for 
the number of correct choices. However, in relation to the number 
of correct explanations, conditions did differ (p<.001). Condition 
2 was more difficult than condition 1 {p<.05) and condition 3 was 
more difficult than condition 1 (p<.01). Conditions 2 and 3 did 
not differ significantly. At age 7, conditions did not differ either 
in relation to the number of correct choices nor in relation to the 
number of correct explanations. The interaction effects are shown 
in Figures 1 and 2, Appendix B. 
The age, condition and sex interaction effect was significant 
only for the number of correct choices, £(4,96) = 3.91, £<.01. The 
interaction effects are shown in Figure 1, Appendix 0. The relatively 
small F_value might suggest that the effects of such interaction 
were not as strong. The means and standard deviations taken separately 
for boys and girls are presented in Table 2, Appendix E. 
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DISCUSSION 
It has been suggested that young children are not aware of their 
own memory and communicative abilities (Flavell and Wellraan, 1977). 
The lack of this awareness can be partially attributed to the lack 
of knowledge that is contained under the person, task and strategy 
variables. Young children do not understand how one'-s memory/com­
municative abilities differ relative to who is doing the memorizing/ 
communicating (person variable), relative to what is to be remembered/ 
communicated (task variable), and relative to how one goes about 
memorizing/communicating (strategy variable). Furthermore, young 
children might not be aware of how these variables taken together 
can affect one'-s cognitive performance. They might not understand 
how some individuals prefer one strategy to another (person and 
strategy), that the use of strategy variables should depend on the 
nature of the task (task and strategy), that the difficulty of the 
task changes depending who is involved with the task (person and task), 
and that strategic behavior needs to be related to both the person and 
the task (strategy and person and task). 
While many researchers have investigated the individual effects 
of such variables on cognitive performances of children, only a few 
researchers have attempted to investigate children^: knowledge of the 
combined effects of various person, task and strategy variables. 
Wellman (1978), and Wellman et al. (1981) looked at the children's 
understanding of the two-way interactions of these variables on memory 
behaviors. The findings of the two studies were different for the 
performances of the 5-year-olds. In the 1978 study, 5-year-olds did 
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not understand the two-way interactions, while in the 1931 study 5-
year-olds understood such interactions. Thus, in order to understand 
better the reasoning of 5-year-olds, more research seemed necessary. 
Furthermore, the above studies did not look at children's understanding 
of the three-way interactions of the variables. Research related to 
children's understanding of the combined effects of person, task and 
strategy variables on communicative behaviors has not been done. 
Research attempting to look at the possible commonalities among memory 
and communication in relation to the variable category is limited to a 
study by Yussen and Bird (1979). The study, which pointed to the 
notable parallels in the performances of 4 and 6-year-olds across 
memory, communication and perception, looked only at the separate 
effects of the person, task and strategy variables. It seemed 
interesting to find out whether or not the same pattern of under­
standing would be obtained when understanding of the combined effects 
of person, task and strategy variables would be assessed. 
The first purpose of the present study was to look at children's 
understanding of the combined effects of the person, task and strategy 
variables on memory and communicative behaviors. The following 
questions were asked: (1) When do children become aware of such 
interaction? (2) Is understanding of the independent effects of the 
person, task and strategy varibles necessary for understanding the 
interactions among the variables? and (3) Do children first learn 
that more than one variable needs to be taken into consideration to 
solve the problem and only later understand how those variables 
interact and affect one's cognitive abilities, or are these concepts 
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acquired at the same time? 
In general, performances of the 4 and 5-year-olds were better when 
understanding of the separate effects of person, task and strategy 
variables was required. In relation to condition 1, children were 
able to effectively choose the correct picture card as well as give 
an adequate explanation as to why that particular card had been chosen. 
This absence of significant age differences in relation to the under­
standing of the separate effects of the person, task and strategy 
variables was not surprising. Indeed, these findings confirmed pre­
vious reports. Kreutzer et al. (1975) have noted the ability of even 
very young children to effectively deal with problems where such 
knowledge was needed, even when children""s explanations about the 
problems were demanded. It is of interest to note that performances 
of 7-year-olds did not differ across the conditions and the type of 
responses recorded. Seven-year-olds performed at the ceiling level 
across all three conditions and both types of responses recorded. 
Performances of the 4-year-old children differed significantly 
from the 5- and 7-year-olds on conditions where their knowledge of the 
interactions of variables was needed. In relation to condition 2, 
when compared to 5- and 7-year olds, 4-year-olds performed poorly 
across both-dependent measures. They often failed to give an 
appropriate explanation as to why that particular card had been chosen. 
Five and 7-year-olds performed better across both dependent measures. 
They were able to correctly choose an appropriate picture card and were 
also able to give an adequate explanation as to why that particular card 
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had been chosen. It needs to be mentioned that the performances of the 
7-year-olds were better than the performances of the 5-year-olds for 
both the measures, even though the difference between the groups was not 
statistically significant. It seems obvious then that the addition of 
an extra variable significantly affected the performances of the 4-year-
olds, but not the 5 and 7-year-olds. This ability of the 5-year-olds to 
understand the way variables interact and affect one^s cognitive per­
formances is a major finding of the present study. 
In relation to condition 3, when compared to 5- and 7-year olds, 
the 4-year-olds performed poorly across both dependent measures. Hie 5-
and 7-year-olds performed well across both the measures, however, the 
performances of the 5- and 7-year-olds differed significantly (p<.05) in 
relation to the number of correct explanations. These findings seem to 
indicate that: (1) the addition of a third variable affected significantly 
only the performances of the 4-year-olds, but not those of the 5- and 
7-year-olds; (2) the performance of children of all three ages were 
similar for condition 3 and condition 2. The addition of a third variable 
did not then make the task qualitatively more difficult. Once a child 
understood that paying attention to more than one variable was needed 
to solve the problem, it did not matter whether the total number of 
variables was 2 or 3, and (3) the understanding of three-way inter­
actions of variables continues to grow beyond the initial understanding 
of such interaction at age 5. 
Wellraan et al. (1981) also indicated that 5-year-olds do understand 
the interactions among memory variables- The study, however, looked 
only at the two-way interaction of variables, and only at the number of 
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correct choices, but not at the number of correct explanations given 
by a child. Recently, studies in other areas of development have 
shown that 5-year-olds are capable of understanding the way variables 
interact. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) indicated that preoperational 
children are able to consider both height and width in order to make 
judgments of quantity. Surber (1977) looked at the ability of children 
to consider intentions and consequences in moral judgments and found 
that 5-year-olds are capable of integrating those attributes. 
These studies clearly indicated nonegocentric and noncentered 
thinking of the 5-year-olds. As such the findings disagreed with the 
Piagetian notion of what typical 5-year-olds can do. According to 
Piaget^s theory of cognitive development, 5-year-olds are in general 
seen as unable to consider more than one factor, variable or 
perspective in order to deal with the task effectively. Piaget and 
Inhelder (1959) showed that preschool children did poorly on the 
tasks used to assess concepts such as decentration, irreversi­
bility, etc- According to the authors, children failed to do well 
because they '•centered'" their attention to some single feature salient 
or interesting to them, thus neglecting other task-relevant features. 
One reason for such discrepancy in the results could be 
attributed to the methods used. Indeed, the methods used are very 
important. Wellman et al. (1981) and Flavell et al. (1970) stated 
that the reason their 5-year-olds failed to do well on the tasks was 
due to the difficulty of the task and the task instructions. There­
fore, when children fail to do well on a task an important question 
that must ba asked is: Did they fail because of the difficulty of 
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the task instructions or because they did not understand the concept 
in question? 
The question: "To what extent is understanding of the separate 
effects of the person, task and strategy variables necessary for 
understanding of the interactions among the variables?" cannot be 
addressed. Since the majority of children performed well on condition 
1, the necessary comparisons between the conditions cannot be made 
to answer such a question. Condition 1 was made easy intentionally. 
This was done to assure better understanding of conditions 2 and 3 
since the m^'or concern of the study was to assess the understanding 
of the interactions of the variables. However, the results for the 
4-year-olds appear to indicate that knowledge of the separate effects 
of the variables precedes knowledge of the combined effects; the 
extent to which single variable knowledge is a necessary prerequisite 
for multiple variable knowledge cannot be determined on the basis of 
this study""s results. 
Flavell and Wellman (1977) suggested that the knowledge of simple 
memory variables continues to develop after age 5 and even after age 
10. The finding of the present study suggesting that the 5-year-olds 
understood quite well the interactions, leads one to think that 
complete understanding of the effects of the variables separately is 
not a necessary requirement for understanding their interactions. 
Children"*5 scores for the number of correct choices were consist­
ently better than children""s scores for the number of correct 
explanations. This was true for all three conditions and all ages 
except the 7-year-olds who performed at ceiling level across all the 
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tasks. The discrepancies in the scores tended to be related to the 
age of the child and the difficulty of the task. The younger the 
child and the harder the task the greater the differences between 
the scores were observed. Thus for very young children, the awareness 
that more than one variable needs to be taken into consideration to 
solve a problem seems to emerge before the awareness of how those 
variables interact and affect one^s cognitive abilities. 
In relation to the findings of children's understanding of the 
interactions of variables, it would be of interest to: (1) train 4-
year-olds and see whether or not different training strategies would 
improve their understanding of the interactions and (2) look at the 
relationships between the metacognitive awareness and cognitive 
behaviors. Does the awareness that more than one variable needs to 
be taken into consideration to solve the problem indeed affect the 
child's actual behavior? 
The second purpose of the present study was to assess whether 
or not children's understanding of the importance of person, task 
and strategy variables follows the same pattern of development across 
memory and communication. The results indicate that children's under­
standing of variable category is remarkably similar across the two 
cognitive domains, for all three age groups tested, for all three 
conditions and for both types of responses recorded. This finding 
is consistent with that of Yussen and Bird (1979), which indicated 
that the pattern of understanding of simple variables was the same 
for memory, communication and attention. Additionally, however, this 
study shows that the same pattern of development also holds true when 
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children's understanding of the two- and three-way interactions among 
these variables is assessed. These two studies are the only ones 
providing empirical support for the existence of '•common insights'" 
that children have across different cognitive domains in relation to 
the variable category. 
Flavell (1976) stated: "We psychologists tend to think that there 
is only one cognitive phenomenon called 'memory'* and another, wholly 
different and unrelated one called '•communication'-.... The reality is 
that there are deep commonalities among such cognitive phenomena and 
explicating these commonalities may give us a more integrated view of 
cognitive development" (pg. 6). 
What seems to be an issue here is the distinction between hetero­
geneity and homogeneity of cognitive development. Does cognitive 
development appear to be more homogenious (the level and style of 
child^s thinking tends to be very similar across different situations, 
tasks and cognitive domains) or does it appear to be more heterogenious 
(the level and style of child^s thinking varies across different 
situations, tasks and cognitive domains)? Needless to say, the 
issue of homogeneity and heterogeneity of cognitive development is 
one of the most controversial in the field. 
There are a number of difficulties involved in testing for homo­
geneity and/or heterogeneity of development. One is methodological. 
The questions that needs to be asked is: Are the tests that are being 
used to tap the awareness of a particular concept across cognitive 
domains equally sensitive? Perhaps a particular test is more suited 
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to test for the awareness of a concept in one cognitive domain than 
in another domain. The other difficulty could be caused by individual 
differences, e.g., a child might have enjoyed doing something more, 
has spent more time doing it and, therefore, would perform much better 
when tested than on something he/she is not interested in. Situations 
like this would make development appear more heterogeneous. On the 
other hand, a child may attempt to solve all the problems in a more 
even fashion, what Siegler (1981, p. 65) calls '•fall-back-rules'". 
Situations like this would make development appear more homogeneous. 
The present study clearly indicates homogeneity of development 
across two cognitive domains, across the three age groups tested for 
the understanding of the importance of a limited set of variables. 
However, before such conclusions could be accepted, more research 
is necessary on a wider variety of variables and cognitive domains. 
It would be also of interest to address the Sensitivity category 
introduced by Flavell and Wellman (1977). 
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SUMMARY 
The purpose of the present study was: (1) to look at when 
children become aware of how different variables presented individ­
ually and in combination influence one^s memory and communicative 
performances, and (2) to assess whether or not children's under­
standing of these variables follows the same pattern of development 
across memory and communication. The variables tested were: person 
(who is doing the memorizing/communicating), task (what is to be 
remembered/communicated) and strategy (how to memorize/communicate). 
Eighteen 4, 5 and 7-year-old children participated in the study. 
The stimuli consisted of 18 sets of 3 or 4 different picture cards 
with drawings of easily recognizable objects. The same stimuli 
were used for both the memory and communication tasks in order to 
assure constancy among variables.in terms of difficulty. A child, 
however, was asked to respond to the stimuli differently. On each 
task three conditions were tested: (1) judging the difficulty of a 
memory and a communication task based on variations in one variable 
only, either person, task or strategy, (2) judging the difficulty 
of a memory and a communication task based on variations in two 
variables together, person x task, person x strategy, strategy x 
task and (3) judging the difficulty of a memory and a communication 
task based on variations in all three variables simultaneously, 
person x task x strategy. All tasks were administered during one 
session. Responses recorded were both the chosen picture card and 
an explanation given by the child as to why that particular card 
had been chosen. 
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No main effect of cognitive domain was found, suggesting that 
performances of children seem to be the same across both cognitive 
domains. 
Performance of the 4, 5 and 7-year-old children did not differ 
when their knowledge of the separate effects of the person, task 
and strategy variables was assessed. However, performance of the 
4-year-olds, but not 5 and 7-year-olds differed significantly on 
the conditions where their knowledge of the interactions of the 
variables was assessed. Four-year-olds performed poorly across both 
conditions and both dependent measures. Five and 7-year-olds 
performed better across both conditions and both measures, however, 
performances of the 5 and 7-year-olds differed significantly for 
condition 3 in relation to the number of correct explanations. 
These findings seem to indicate that: (1) the addition of variables 
affected significantly only the performances of 4-year-olds, but 
not 5 and 7-year-olds, (2) the performances of children of all three 
ages were similar for condition 3 and condition 2 and (3) the under­
standing of three-way interaction of variables continues to develop 
beyond the initial understanding of such interaction at age 5. 
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APPENDIX B: INTERACTION EFFECTS 
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Condition 1 Condition li Condition ili 
4-year-olds 
5-year-olds 
7-year olds 
Figure 1. Number of Correct Choices as a Function of Age and 
Condition 
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Condition I Condition II Condition III 
4-year-olds 
5-year-olds 
7-year olds 
Figure 2. Number of Correct Explanations as a Function of Age 
and Condition 
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APPENDIX C: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE TWO COGNITIVE 
DOMAINS, THREE CONDITIONS AND THE THREE AGE GROUPS 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for the Two Cognitive Domains, Three Conditions and 
the Three Age Groups 
Cognitive Domains and Age 
Memory Communication 
Variables Age Age 
4 5 7 4 5 7 
Condition 1 
If of Corr. Choices 
X 5.06 5.50 5.89 5.06 5.56 5.89 
SO 1.35 1.04 .47 1.16 .62 .47 
# of Corr. Explanations 
X 4.94 5.39 5.89 4.89 5.61 5.89 
SO 1.35 1.04 .47 1.49 .50 .47 
Condition 2 
# of Corr. Choices 
X 4.17 5.33 5.94 4.11 5.39 5,83 
SO 1.67 1.19 .24 1.64 .98 .71 
# of Corr. Explanations 
J 2.44 4.61 5.94 3.00 4.50 5.78 
SD 2.06 2.17 .24 1.94 2.23 .94 
Condition 3 
It of Corr. Choices 
X 3.83 4.83 5.67 4.00 5.00 5.83 
SD 2.26 2.09 1.41 2.52 2.30 .71 
# of Corr. Explanations 
X 2.17 4.00 5.67 2.33 4.67 5.83 
SD 2.68 2.91 1.41 2.02 2.57 .71 
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APPENDIX D: INTERACTION EFFECTS PRESENTED SEPARATELY FOR BOYS 
AND GIRLS 
68 
Condition I Condition II Condition IIi 
Boys Girls 
4-year-olds __________ 4-year-olds 
5-year-olds —-——5-year-olds 
:======= 7-year olds ==&»=»=»***=»=*' 7-year olds 
Figure 1. Number of Correct Choices as a Function of Age and Condition 
Taken Separately for Boys and Girls 
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APPENDIX E: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF SCORES PRESENTED 
SEPARATELY FOR BOYS AND GIRLS 
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Scores Presented Separately for Boys and Girls for the 
Three Age Groups, the Three Conditions and over Domains Combined 
Variables Age and Sex 
4 5 / 
lioys Girls Boys Girls Boys G i r l s  
Condition 1 
# of Corr. Choices 
X 4.70 5.50 5.78 5.28 5.78 6.00 
SD 1.46 .73 .55 1.02 .65 .88 
# of Corr. Explanations 
X 4.60 5.31 5.72 5.28 5.78 6.00 
SD 1.70 .79 .57 .96 .65 .14 
Condition 2 
# of Corr. Choices 
X 4.20 4.06 5.17 5.56 5.78 6.00 
SO 1.80 1.48 1.15 .98 .73 .88 
# of Corr. Explanations 
X 2.95 2.45 4.61 4.50 5.72 6.00 
SD 2.40 1.37 1.85 2.50 .96 .14 
Condition 3 
# of Corr. Choices 
X 4.35 3.38 4.67 5.17 5.50 6.00 
SD 2.28 2.42 2.35 2.01 1.54 .88 
# of Corr. Explanations 
I 2.70 1.69 4.33 4.33 5.50 6.30 
SD 2.74 2.68 2.77 2.77 1.54 .14 
